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Abstract 
Research on formal and informal financial markets in the Sahel can be seen and 
interpreted through two conceptual frameworks: the project focus and the institutional focus. 
After several decades a consensus is emerging on the appropriate institutional and policy 
stance in addressing the problems of Sahelian finance. This consensus, along with an 
agenda for future research, is offered in these closing comments. 
SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED AND RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 
by 
Douglas H. Graham 
This summary of conference proceedings falls into three sections: (i) the contrasting 
conceptual frameworks that have influenced work on finance in the Sahel region; (ii) the 
emerging consensus on the recent experience in promoting rural finance in the Sahel; and 
(iii) a research agenda for future work in the region. 
l Contrasting Conceptual Framework 
Two contrasting frameworks stand out in work on the Sahel. As set forth in figure 
1 the project focused initiatives exclusively emphasized credit, and more specifically agricul-
tural credit. This credit was targeted for a specific clientele with subsidized interest rates 
in specialized institutions (usually agricultural development banks) that were ''borrower 
dominated." In short, all the procedures and practices within the institution in the project 
were directed to facilitate quick and easy disbursement of loans to borrowers with little 
attention given to loan recovery procedures. Credit needs were emphasized rather than 
creditworthiness or the debt repaying capacity of the borrower. 
Not surprisingly, these specialized credit disbursement institutions (or projects) were 
not sustainable. They were not financially viable due to high overhead or transaction costs 
(i.e. high non-interest operational costs to carry out estimates of credit needs, identify and 
document targeted clientele, engage in loan supervision, and absorb cumbersome reporting 
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requirements) and low loan recovery efforts. The transaction costs of administering these 
projects/institutions were greatly underestimated. 
A contrast to these more traditional project efforts were those that emphasized 
institutional viability (see figure 1). This institutional focus was concerned with the supply 
of a complete range of financial services in rural areas (i.e. savings deposits as well as 
loans). Hence these programs used the word "finance" rather than the more narrowly 
focused term of credit. Borrower domination was displaced by a more neutral concern that 
also accepted the fiduciary responsibility of protecting savers' interests (i.e., making credit-
worthy loans). Hence the strategic role of loan recovery stands out in evaluating institution-
al viability along with realistic interest rates to reward savers and to cover the administrative 
costs of lending and recovering loans. Finally, loan targeting is eliminated in the institution-
al approach with loans being granted for any creditworthy activity in rural areas. This 
highlights the legitimate role of non-agricultural trading and artisan activity and, at the same 
time, allows for long run institutional viability by reducing risk through portfolio diversifica-
tion into these non-agricultural activities in rural areas. 
2. An Emerging Consensus 
The second diagram (figure 2) sets forth an emerging consensus on what we have 
learned from the last two decades' experience with numerous financial programs and 
projects. There may be some disagreement on the relative importance of each of these 
lessons but the main focus is clear. 
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First, there should be much less targeting of credit. Indeed, some would argue for 
no targeting whatsoever. Targeting usually cannot be effectively carried out, and, in 
addition, incurs high transaction costs. Savings mobilization should be encouraged as an 
important element in developing financial markets and financial institutions serving those 
markets. This service reaches a much larger proportion of the rural poor than loan services 
and helps them smooth out their seasonal consumption needs. Deposit and savings mobili-
zation creates a new constituency within financial institutions that is concerned with 
creditworthy borrowers who will repay their loans. Hence financial institutions become less 
"borrower dominated." In short, sustained financial intermediation (between savers and 
borrowers) should be the goal of financial programs and projects and not the mere creation 
of financial vehicles acting as conduits for credit. 
At the same time, there is a need for more autonomy and decentralization in the 
supply of financial services at a branch level of banks or within village based savings and 
loan associations. This decentralization should be associated with multiple financial services 
being transacted between the lender and borrower through frequent contact and discussion. 
The autonomy implies that the lender has the right to say no to a risky loan request. An 
additional consensus has emerged that non-agricultural loans should be incorporated into 
the portfolio of rural lenders to diversify risk and facilitate rural development. 
It is now recognized that transactions costs are important in financial markets. 
Borrowers as well as lenders incur non-interest transactions costs in trying to secure or 
supply financial services. Frequently these can be more burdensome than interest rates, 
especially to small borrowers trying to secure a loan. Realistic interest rates are now widely 
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recognized as necessary to cover the costs and risks of lending. Subsidized interest rates 
lead to financial insolvency and invariably worsen the distribution of income by being 
captured only by those fortunate enough to secure a loan and with larger loans securing a 
larger advantage than smaller loans. 
It has also become apparent that group finance administered through non-govern-
ment organizations (NGOs) can represent a risk reducing and transaction cost reducing 
innowtion in the supply of financial services to a rural clientele. NGOs can function alone 
or as an intermediary between a bank and a low income clientele. Savings and credit 
cooperatives have proven successful as non-bank financial intermediaries servicing a 
relatively marginal rural clientele in Africa. At the same time, small group orientated 
initiatives, in part emulating the Grameen Bank model, have been launched with some 
apparent initial success in selected African countries. These current successes build upon 
the positive virtues of informal finance in drawing upon collateral substitutes such as joint 
liability, close friendship and trust, and the potential of peer group sanctions to promote 
cooperative behavior (i.e., loan repayment). Such experiences highlight the importance of 
the role and presence of informal finance in rural areas as an ongoing activity that deserves 
more study for those concerned with financial innowtions in rural areas. This experience 
has also recognized the positive gains associated with the dynamic interaction between 
formal and informal financial markets. 
Finally, there is agreement on a continuing impasse in rural financial markets in 
Africa, i.e., the inability of any financial institution to service lone term loans without 
effective collateral institutionalized with secure property rights. On the one hand, the lender 
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should protect the interests of its short term depositors by not lending too long into the 
future. Term transformation of short term liabilities into longer term assets must be kept 
within bounds. Furthermore, the lender should periodically alter its long term loan rate to 
correct for the effects of inflation eroding its real interest income. In the end, long term 
lending is highly risky in an environment of frequently changing commodity prices, exchange 
rates, and interest rates. It is not wise for a lender to have a portfolio too heavily locked 
into by term loans in light of these changing circumstances affecting the financial viability 
of a lending institution. 
3. Research Agenda for the Future 
The third diagram outlines a research agenda for the future for studying African rural 
financial markets. First, traders and enterprise finance should be researched more thor-
oughly in Africa. There is a strong likelihood that these larger enterprises and wholesalers 
are net borrowers from the formal financial system (i.e., they borrow more from banks than 
they put back in deposits). However, through the consignment of goods or sales on credit 
they transfer down through their network of micro-enterprises and retailers the liquidity they 
were able to secure initially from banks. This linkage between formal and informal finance 
plays a valuable role in extending short term working capital down to smaller economic units 
than banks could ever hope to reach directly. In short, these informal enterprise intermedi-
aries are net creditors in the informal financial markets as they enjoy informational econo-
mies and low transaction costs in extending credit through their network of retail buyers. 
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It is relevant to document the terms and conditions of these contractual arrangements 
between wholesalers and retailers and between retailers and their final customers. Once 
this is accomplished it will be possible to undertake the second research task of determining 
the degree of segmentation and integration of formal and informal finance and the proper-
ties of the contracts that characterize these markets. This can be done through a compari-
son of the range of interest rates, term length, collateral, and transactions costs that exist 
for formal and informal lenders and borrowers. To the extent that fragmentation prevails, 
policy initiatives can be considered to reduce the barriers to promote greater integration of 
financial markets. 
A third research task should be directed towards documenting the importance of 
deposit services to small business, groups, and households. These units are invariably net 
borrowers (or debtors) from the informal systems, but net creditors to the formal system 
(i.e., they have more deposits in banks than the loans they receive from banks). Therefore 
the expansion of branches and deposit agencies (including mobil deposit taking services) will 
directly benefit these more marginal groups in society through improved access to deposit 
services. 
A fourth research objective should focus on determining the nature of the collateral 
substitutes operating in the informal lending world of Africa. This research should try to 
distinguish between joint liability arrangements that are successful in generating responsible 
loan repayments and those that provoke free rider problems (i.e., non-cooperative behavior 
leading to poor loan recovery on the part of members in a group). Also, the specific 
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features of collateral substitutes for private traders should be investigated to learn more 
about how they manage the risk of arrears in their private trading networks. 
The final research objective should focus on the set of issues affecting the restructur-
ing of formal financial systems in Africa, particularly as they pertain to institutions serving 
a rural clientele. The profile of a viable financial institution should be established highlight-
ing portfolio diversification, managerial autonomy and accountability, and asset and liability 
management practices to reduce the risks of lending. Then the transition path an institution 
must traverse to move from insolvency to solvency should be investigated. The need for an 
early warning system to track loan repayment by loan type and borrower characteristics is 
essential for bank managers to remain in control of their portfolios. The establishment of 
this tracking system should be a high priority for research, especially for institutions engaged 
in making long term loans where the early profile of installment payments should be related 
to the installment amount owed. This early warning tracking device will allow the institution 
to detect problem loans quickly before these term loans have matured into uncorrectable 
defaults. 
Finally, it is important to underscore the distinction between bad and good regulation 
of formal financial markets in any restructuring of financial systems. Bad or counterproduc-
tive regulations refers to interest rates ceiling, and selective credit policies that attempt to 
control the pricing and the allocation of credit. These non-market rationing schemes lend 
themselves to political intrusion and institutional insolvency. Good and proper regulation 
refers to bank examination and supervisory procedures that investigate the quality of the 
assets in a bank's portfolio. This fiduciary or prudential regulation, protecting depository 
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interests and systemic stability becomes more and more important as programs of structural 
adjustment remove interest rate ceilings and selective credit allocations in a spirit of 
financial hberalization. Once banks are given the freedom to lend widely without interfer-
ence, government authorities must be trained and prepared to supervise and monitor the 
risks this freedom may introduce into the financial system. 
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PROJECT FOCVS: CBEDIT 
The borrower 
Targeted credit 
Output, income, employ-
ment, technology adoption 
goals 
Credit needs 
Quick disbursement as 
dominant goal with little 
interest in effective loan 
recovery 
Subsidized interest rates 
Transaction costs ignored 
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Figure 1 
vs. 1. 
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INSTITUTIONAL FOCUS: 
FINANCE 
The Depositor-saver 
Open, untargeted loans 
Long run institutional viabil-
ity 
Credinvorthiness or debt 
capacity 
Strategic role of loan recov-
ery in evaluating institution-
al performance 
Realistic interest rates 
Importance of transaction 
costs (non-interest rate 
operational costs) 
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Figure 2 
AN EMERGING CONSENSUS 
1. Less to no targeting of loans 
2. Importance of savings mobilization 
3. Financial intermediation not mere conduits of credit 
4. Frequent contact, multiple services 
5. Need for decentralization - more local autonomy in the supply of financial services 
6. Inclusion of rural non-agricultural activities diversifying the portfolio 
7. Realistic interest rates 
8. Transaction costs important - simple procedures important 
9. Groups can represent positive innovations with NGO support 
10. Continuing impasse in servicing long term loans without institutional role for collat-
eral - prudential protection of depositor-savers 
11. Informal finance important role and presence 
12. Greater recognition of positive gains associated with linkages between formal and 
informal financial networks 
. ... .. .. 
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Figure 3 
RESEARCH DIEMES FOR THE FUTURE 
1. Document Formal-Informal financial linkage network 
Formal Deposits 
(Am/Liab > l)-_,.111._ Net creditor to informal market 
(Asset/Uab < 1) 111 Net debtor to formal market 
Miao-small 
Bnsinesn 
Urban-Rural 
Householm 
Net creditor formal market 
Net debtor informal market 
2. Document financial integration-segmentation formal-informal sectors 
3. Document importance of deposit services to households, groups, small businesses 
4. Determine terms and conditions and "collateral substitutes". Contractual features 
restricting, or enhancing: 
(a) joint liability in groups vs. free rider problem 
(b) contracts in informal chain of finance 
( c) bonded warehouses 
( d) innovations substituting for lack of futures markets or insurance markets 
5. Research agenda for restructuring formal financial system 
(a) Profile of a viable institution 
(b) Transition path 
( c) Early warning system to track loans 
( d) Good regulation vs. bad regulation 
